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Abstract: This paper addresses the question of what options are available to regulate the 
sector in the near future. In order to answer this question, the paper focuses on the 
problem of investment and innovation in an ex ante regulated sector. Relying on existing 
literature, we argue that ex ante regulation could represent a danger for the long-term 
development of the sector by delaying or cancelling investment projects, especially (but 
not only) concerning the construction of new infrastructures. We also argue that ex ante 
regulation is distorting investment itself: incremental investment is privileged as opposed 
to radical investment. In this context, we identify three possible options for regulation in 
the near future: 1) continuing ex ante regulation, 2) substituting ex post regulation for ex 
ante regulation and 3) implementing an industrial policy for macro-strategic reasons. After 
describing a few major mutations in the sector that must be taken into account by 
regulators and presenting the major dilemmas that the latter are facing, we propose two 
possible solutions inspired by foreign policy. The first solution consists of offering investors 
regulation holidays, with regular reviews to deem whether these holidays should be 
prolonged or not. The second solution consists of implementing an industrial policy that 
could take the form of a contract negotiated between the regulator and operators. This 
would guarantee the absence of ex ante regulation if the conditions of the contract (in 
terms of regional planning, price, quality of service, types of investment…) are met. 
Key words: regulation, innovation, investment and industrial policy. 
 
ore than other industries, the telecommunications sector plays an 
important role in the economy and society as a whole: it is a 
source of economic development, regional planning and, in some M 
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respects, of social activity and cohesion (See for instance RÖLLER & 
WAVERMAN, 1996, 2001; MEZOUAGHI, 2005). This importance of the 
telecommunications sector is both due to network externalities and to the 
high rate of innovation characterizing the sector. 
These characteristics justify the State's special interest in the sector and 
its regulation. This regulation usually consists of imposing specific 
obligations on operators (in terms of price, interconnection, access etc.), but 
can also consist of the absence of any intervention if this solution is 
considered more efficient. Asymmetrical ex ante intervention has been the 
main rule in many countries for the past decade or so in order to promote 
competition and guarantee universal service. The question this paper seeks 
to address is whether regulation policy needs to be changed to foster the 
long-term growth of innovation and investment, thus creating a dynamic 
perspective for the future. 
In the first section, this paper briefly addresses the question of the origins 
and limits of telecommunications regulation. Beginning with a short summary 
of asymmetrical ex ante regulation tools and aims, we challenge the idea 
that using these tools in order to introduce effective competition can have 
negative effects on the future of the telecommunications sector. In the 
second section, we address the question of how regulation policy should 
look in the near future. To answer this question, we identify the three options 
open to regulators, highlighting the characteristics and tendencies that the 
latter must take into account. Finally, on the basis of these regulatory options 
and the changes characterizing the sector, we suggest two possible ways of 
regulating the sector in the near future. 
  Telecommunications regulation:  
origins and performances 
Efficiency and regulation 
Regulation tools aim to develop and/or stabilize an economic or social 
system. In other words, they aim to improve its efficiency in its various 
dimensions. 
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At the mesoeconomic or macroeconomic level, the first and most famous 
dimension of efficiency is Pareto-efficiency (or allocative efficiency). This 
indicates whether scarce resources are well allocated (can the situation of 
an agent be improved without negatively impacting that of another agent?). 
This concept has two major advantages: it is independent from the definition 
of any welfare function (and thus from subjective and political decision) and 
it is theoretically linked to perfect competition. Indeed, perfect competition is 
a sufficient condition for achieving allocative efficiency. Thus, developing the 
conditions of perfect competition could be a way of reaching allocative 
efficiency. Even if this reasoning can be criticized, as we will see later in the 
article, it is the main explanation for past and current policies in the 
telecommunications sector. 
However, improving allocative efficiency is not the only goal that the 
regulator wants to achieve by developing effective competition. Indeed, even 
if market failures still characterize the sector, the choice of introducing 
competition is often considered as the appropriate tool for two reasons: 
firstly, monopoly is often not considered as very efficient due to the weak 
incentives it gives operators to reduce their costs. This so called Leibenstein 
(1966) "X-inefficiency theory" explains that competition is a way to reach 
productive (i.e. cost minimizing) efficiency. Secondly, competition is 
supposed (although this is not proven) to "produce" new types of markets 
and firms, which are more efficient than the existing ones. Competition 
should thus lead not only to static efficiency, but also to dynamic efficiency. 
Finally, we must note that allocative and productive efficiencies (in their 
static or dynamic dimensions) are not the only aims of the regulator. Indeed, 
allocative efficiency has little to say about economic and social topics such 
as social cohesion, redistribution, regional planning etc. These aspects 
mainly concern distributive efficiency, which refers to the economy's ability to 
achieve a distribution of the scarce resources that maximize a given (and 
subjective) social welfare function. Nevertheless, distributive efficiency is 
compatible with allocative efficiency and with perfect competition since any 
chosen Pareto-equilibrium (corresponding to the chosen redistribution) can 
theoretically be achieved by competition. This idea is the foundation of the 
concept of universal service, implemented by ex ante regulation, but defined 
by policy makers. This article does not deal very much with this aspect and 
concentrates on the development of effective competition in order to achieve 
allocative and productive efficiencies. 
In order to develop competition, two types of regulation are considered 
here: ex ante and ex post regulation. "Ex post regulation" is the application 
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of common competition law. It aims at preventing (ex ante) and prosecuting 
(ex post) operator abuses of a dominant position. By limiting the market 
power of firms, it is supposed to contribute to allocative efficiency gains, but 
does not necessarily contribute to the development of effective competition. 
Moreover, when a sector such as telecommunications is liberalized, 
economies of scale and scope, but also network externalities, naturally limit 
the development of competition. This explains why "ex ante regulation" (i.e. 
sectoral regulation) has been used to introduce effective competition in the 
services market and, where possible, in the infrastructure market 1. 
Indeed, the nature of the problem is different for the regulator depending 
on the layer of the sector under consideration. Let us describe the two main 
layers in a simplified way: 
• The lowest layer is that of infrastructures (considered in the broadest 
sense). It is characterized by strong economies of scale (especially for the 
local loop), preventing easy, facility-based competition, which would ensure 
the absence of barriers in the services market. In this layer, infrastructures 
are mainly owned by the incumbent and a few operators. In Noam's 
typology, countries are characterized by "2.5 platforms" (two powerful wires - 
telecom and cable - plus a few smaller infrastructures) as in the USA, or by 
"1.5 platforms" (one powerful wire - telecom - plus the smaller options) as in 
many European countries. 
• The highest layer is that of services offered to consumers. It is much 
less characterized by economies of scale, but still by economies of scope 
and network externalities. Effective competition is much easier and natural to 
develop if access to the incumbent's infrastructure is provided to competitors 
at a reasonable (generally cost-oriented) and "non-discriminatory" rate. 
Given the structure of the sector, there are two types of tool available to 
achieve effective competition: market structure regulation with licensing, and 
price regulation of wholesale and retail markets. 
In order to develop competition, licensing can prevent the dominant firm 
from accessing new emerging markets (for at least a period of time). 
However, price regulation is probably the most important way to force 
competition. Indeed, through asymmetrical obligations imposed on the 
incumbent (or on the operator with significant market power), the first step in 
                     
1 Note that ex ante regulation also intervenes ex post, in particular when the ARN receives a 
complaint. 
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ex ante regulation is to provide cost-based and non discriminatory access to 
infrastructure in order to allow the incumbent's competitors to enter the 
services market. This step generally relies on the regulation of both 
wholesale and retail prices (in order to control possible anti-competitive 
practices). This asymmetrical intervention is supposed to be stronger for 1.5 
platform countries than for their 2.5 counterparts. The second step is to 
favour progressively facility-based competition, in line with Cave's ladder of 
investment theory, for example 2. In a final step, the ex ante regulator should 
disappear (except for managing and controlling the universal service) and 
should be replaced by the ex post regulator. Ex ante regulation is conceived 
as a transitory form of regulation before full and free competition takes hold. 
Achieving all of these three stages remains quite difficult, particularly due 
to both information asymmetry (between the regulator and operators) and 
the method used to establish wholesale or retail rates. Depending on the 
regulator's choices, the market can be exposed to efficient or inefficient 
entry, and operators can be encouraged or discouraged to innovate and to 
invest. This can result in an increase or decrease in global welfare. As 
shown in the next section, these aspects raise the important problem of 
dynamic efficiency. 
  Paradoxical, but transitory intervention?  
The research, innovation and investment problem 
As we just pointed out, ex ante regulation consists of a paradoxical 
intervention in order to introduce competition into the market. While the 
paradox of intervening to reach a free competitive market is understandable, 
this principle can also be criticized for at least two reasons. Firstly, 
neoclassical theory has shown that fostering competition, market by market, 
can be counter-productive when looking at the general equilibrium resulting 
                     
2 In this theory, the regulator first sets low access prices to the infrastructures, so that 
competitors enter the services market, develop their market shares and benefit from network 
externalities. When competitors have sufficiently developed their business, the access price can 
increase in order to incite competitors to build their own infrastructure (instead of renting that of 
the incumbent). Since the telecommunications sector is composed of many layers, the idea is to 
regulate each layer’s access price in order to favour a progressive climbing of the ladder: 
Competitors invest sequentially in services and national points of access, then in regional points 
of access, then in local ones etc. However, as we will see, applying this theory could also 
discourage incumbents (and possibly other operators) from investing and innovating. The final 
results of such a policy are thus uncertain. 
110   No. 64, 4th Q. 2006 
from this policy (LIPSEY & LANCASTER, 1956). Secondly, if the persistence 
of market failures justifies the persistence of regulation, new problems 
emerge when the transitory regulation becomes durable. These problems 
concern the compatibility between the regulation process and the 
development of research, innovation and investment. 
Indeed, if competition introduced by ex ante regulation can be considered 
as responsible for the emergence of many new services (especially in the 
internet and mobile telephony fields) and for the decrease in prices, sectoral 
growth can also be attributed to the major changes that took place before 
liberalization, especially in Europe. These changes include the fact that the 
techniques and standards for mobile telephony were mainly developed 
before 1998, while the internet and its main associated tools were invented 
by the U.S. army and developed by the public sector. The internet was also 
opened up to commercial purposes by the Clinton administration before 
1998. Following on from this latter assumption, competition only accelerated 
the adoption of innovation and price decreases in the short term. These two 
points of view regarding the role of competition in ICT growth cannot be 
considered as purely abstract since the regulatory choices have been 
heavily discussed in the United States, especially the trade-off between 
competition on the one hand and investment and innovation on the other 
hand (JORDE, SIDAK & TEECE, 2000; CRANDALL, 2005). Is the theory 
able to clarify the effects of competition and of regulation? 
In order to answer this question, we propose to distinguish between two 
types of innovation: incremental and radical. Incremental innovation can be 
defined as innovation aiming at horizontal differentiation. It allows firms to 
provide similar products in terms of quality and functionality, which, however, 
appear different to the various types of consumers. This difference is not due 
to qualitative rupture, but to commercial and development investments. The 
incremental innovation can usually be considered as short-term oriented and 
mainly benefits the firm that introduced it. Conversely, radical innovation 
corresponds to a qualitative rupture. It induces vertical differentiation. In the 
telecommunications sector, radical innovation is often associated with 
investment in new infrastructures, but also concerns the development of 
radically new services. Radical innovation can mainly be considered as long-
term oriented and usually benefits the whole sector in the end. These two 
types of innovations appear to be complementary. In this article, investment 
leading to incremental (/radical) innovation will be called incremental 
(/radical) investment. We assume that this distinction also stands for 
upstream R&D investment: the more fundamental the research is, the more 
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it can be considered as radical investment. What does the theory say about 
regulation and investment? 
The main body of research into regulation and investment concerns 
investment in infrastructures. As JORDE, SIDAK & TEECE (2000) point out, 
ex ante regulation of network elements (through mandatory unbundling on a 
cost-oriented and non discriminatory basis) reduces investment by 
incumbents both in maintaining and improving networks, but also in adopting 
new techniques because regulation reduces the option value of investing. At 
the same time, regulation delays investment by competitors since they are 
able to take advantage of incumbents' investment without taking risks. This 
idea has been deepened with the theory of real options. PYNDICK (2003), 
for instance, points out the uncertainty and irreversibility of the heavy 
investments in the telecommunications sector. Mandatory unbundling can 
thus be considered as a transfer of benefits from the investor to its 
competitors without the corresponding transfer of risks (see also BAAKE et 
al., 2005; ALLEMAN & RAPOPPORT, 2006). 
However, in the theoretical debate concerning regulation, innovation and 
investment, no consensus can be established in the very limited literature. 
For instance, concerning the tools that are used, AVERCH & JOHNSON 
(1962) have shown that the rate of return regulation can lead to over-
investment, while the work of GILBERT & NEWBERRY (1988) leads to the 
opposite conclusion. The debate also exists concerning price regulation, but 
seems to be dominated by the risk idea of under-investment in both 
incremental and radical innovation. 
FOROS (2004) and KOTAKORPI (2006) have provided two game theory 
models in which they distinguish one integrated firm (active in both 
infrastructures and services layers) and a competitor (only active in the 
services layer). In their model, investment in the infrastructure (maintenance 
and improvements) can be considered as incremental. The models show 
that when the access rate is regulated, the integrated operator under-invests 
since regulation is equivalent to sharing benefits with competitors. This 
situation is thus socially suboptimal.  
Concerning radical investment, the model by BOURREAU & DOGAN 
(2005) has shown that low unbundling rates can lead to under-investment in 
new infrastructures since competitors prefer to rent an infrastructure, rather 
than build a new and innovating one. In our model (FLACHER & 
JENNEQUIN, 2006a) we have also pointed out that taking into account the 
short and long-term effects of a radical investment on consumer welfare also 
112   No. 64, 4th Q. 2006 
leads to under-investment if the regulator is not able to forecast and 
integrate these long-term effects in its decisions, which is reasonably the 
case. Other models, such as that of GRIMM & ZOETTL (2006) reach similar 
conclusions concerning the risk generated by price regulation for investment 
and thus innovation. 
It is worth underlining at this point that these theoretical warnings 
concerning the efficiency of ex ante regulation, even if not shared by all 
models, are largely corroborated by the few existing empirical analyses 
(FLACHER & JENNEQUIN, 2006b) and raw data. After almost a decade 
(and sometimes more) of telecommunications liberalization, the results of 
regulation appear to be ambiguous: The increased competition does not 
guarantee an improvement in productivity (BOYLAUD & NICOLETTI, 2000; 
LI & XU, 2002), nor an increase in the quality of services (URI, 2003); and 
while prices are decreasing 3, profitability also drops (BORTOLOTTI et al., 
2002), reducing operators' revenues and subsequently the possibility of 
investment. Between 2001 and 2004, for instance, investment by French 
operators dropped by over 48% according to ARCEP data, which cannot 
merely be explained by the bursting of the speculative bubble, cyclical 
investments or by technical advances. The share of invested revenues also 
fell dramatically: from 21.2% in 1995 to 11.3% in France according to ITU's 
data. This situation is similar in all countries (13.5% in 1995 and 6% in 2003 
in the USA, 26% in 1995 and 13% in the United Kingdom 4). 
If incentives to innovate and to invest in the infrastructure are reduced 
instead of stimulated by liberalization and the ex ante regulation process, the 
problem also seems to be very important in the R&D field. According to 
IDATE data, the percentage of the revenues dedicated to R&D by the 
incumbents has fallen (from 3.7% in 1995 to 1.3% in 2004 for France 
Télécom, from 2.4% to 1.4% for British Telecom etc.) and has not 
necessarily been compensated for by R&D growth in the equipment industry. 
Moreover, according to POUILLOT & PUISSOCHET (2002) or to 
CALDERINI & GARRONE (2001, 2002), competition and regulation could 
have structurally modified R&D activities, favouring short-term and very 
application-oriented projects, rather than facing long-term and fundamental 
                     
3 Price globally decreases, but with a large degree of heterogeneity: local rates did not change 
much, while long distance  rates fell dramatically. At the same time, rental rates have increased 
in many cases. For Europe, see, for instance, the 8th to 11th European reports on electronic 
communications, regulation and markets. 
4 Only Korea remains at a quite high level of investment when compared to revenues 
generated: 41.1% in 1995 and 32.5% in 2003 
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research. This substitution between incremental and radical investments in 
R&D can have immediate positive effects, offering a large range of products 
and lower prices, but it could also have negative effects on the dynamics of 
telecommunications development.  
  How should the telecommunications sector  
be regulated in the future? 
Three possible scenarios for the regulation of the sector 
The first option for regulation in the near future consists of retaining the 
same regulation policy, but adapting it to the past and current changes that 
have occurred in the sector. The justification of this option is the persistence 
of market failures. They concern both wholesale markets (still characterized 
by economies of scale) and retail markets (still dominated by network 
externalities). In this context, ex ante regulation in favour of effective 
competition would stimulate technical progress and thus lower fixed costs 
and allow competition to develop. Obligations concerning interconnection 
and the provision of non discriminatory and cost-based wholesale rates 
(together with the monitoring of retail prices) would also contribute to the 
development of a large range of products and to price decreases that are 
advantageous for consumers. Although in the short term it seems possible to 
claim that, by promoting competition, ex ante regulation contributed to these 
positive effects, we have shown that the positive effects in the long-term are 
not guaranteed. Regulation also limits incentives for more fundamental 
research, for radical innovation and investment, however necessary to the 
development of the sector.  
The second option is thus to replace ex ante with ex post regulation, 
relying only on competition law. Indeed, maintaining ex ante regulation 
(which was supposed to be a transitory model of regulation) would partly 
mean a regulation failure. For the moment, this option is not really on the 
agenda, even although a few countries, like France, are announcing that 
they will reduce their intervention in retail markets and although the debate 
over the mandatory unbundling of FTTH local loops is (or has been) very 
active, as in the United States. However, as we will see later, an 
intermediate option between ex ante and ex post regulation is now being 
seriously studied by a few regulators. 
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The third option consists of taking into account the macro-strategic 
dimensions of developing the telecommunications sector at a national and 
international level on the one hand and, the importance of institutions in the 
country's technological path on the other. Choosing this option means 
following a vertical industrial policy that is a "sectoral policy aimed at 
promoting sectors of key importance to the nation due to the independence 
question, technological autonomy, regional or political equilibrium". (COHEN 
& LORENZI, 2000, p. 14). This policy can draw on direct assistance from the 
State. It may also rely on social, cultural and technological policies. In some 
cases the policy can also consist of planning important projects. For many 
economists, the problem of such policies is that they are generally not 
compatible with competition policies. 
As CORIAT (2000) points out, we must distinguish, particularly in 
European policies, between two types of restrictions on industrial policies, 
due to the pre-eminence given to competition policies. One is 
understandable: since national and independent policies inside Europe could 
go against the common interest, limiting unilateral decisions is acceptable. 
However, limiting concerted industrial policies at the European level is more 
debatable. Indeed, this limitation can be explained by the idea, broadly 
accepted in the European Commission, that promoting competition is the 
best way to fight market failures and to best allocate resources. However, 
various authors, like Dixit, Stiglitz and Krugman, have shown that imperfect 
competition can justify an industrial policy for at least two reasons (See, for 
instance, KRUGMAN & HELPMAN, 1985): 
• Economies of scale can justify State help for a given sector since this 
could help to develop competition at an international level and subsequently 
reduce the revenues of monopolies or oligopolies. Thus, an industrial policy 
can reduce market failures and improve global welfare. 
• Comparative advantages are not only due to differences in technical 
or factor allocations. They largely result from a country's history, as well as 
its strategic and technical choices. The State should thus play an active role 
in order to define its priorities for long-term development in partnership with 
economic and social agents. Many countries have expressed the wish to 
develop ICTs: this is the case in the "Lisbon agenda" for European nations, 
in North America, in many Asian countries (like Korea, Japan, etc.). But all of 
these countries do not apply the same policy: the Korean government, for 
instance, intervenes much more than European countries to promote 
investment. 
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These ideas are also developed by the "new geographical economics" 
(KRUGMAN, 1991; FUJITA et al., 1999) considering that industrial policies 
can be justified in order to benefit from proximities and agglomeration effects 
("cluster theory") at a national or regional level. Beyond these macro-
strategic justifications to industrial policies, social and institutional 
dimensions can appear is important because of their role in defining the 
national system of innovation and in orienting a country's technological path. 
Industrial policies can be considered as necessary to enable a country to 
seize opportunities (DAVID, 1975; DOSI, 1988; FREEMAN, 1995; LORENZI 
& BOURLÈS, 1995). Finally, industrial policies can be a means of fighting 
possible destructive or ruinous competition. For the OECD (1993), 
destructive competition refers to: "situations when competition results in 
prices that do not chronically or for extended periods of time cover costs of 
production, particularly fixed costs". 
Among the three identified regulatory options, countries' choices depend 
on the sector, its history and institutions; these choices heavily influence a 
nation's competitive position in the ICT sector. That is why Europe should 
consider the other possible policies in order both to catch the new 
opportunities offered by the sector and to take into account the growing 
risks. 
Regulation and mutations in the telecommunications sector 
Continuing current policy without taking into account the major changes 
that have occurred in the sector over the past decade would pose a major 
threat to its long-term development. Three aspects can be underlined 
concerning those changes. 
Firstly, the rate of technical progress and innovation has accelerated 
substantially. The most emblematic example of this acceleration is the 
increase in the transfer rate in the telecommunications network: this rate 
increased almost fifty-fold in only ten years on the copper local loop (64 kbps 
in 1997 on the PSTN network and 20 Mbps today on ADSL networks). The 
transfer rate has also increased dramatically on wireless networks (9.6 kbps 
in 1996 on GSM and over 10 Mbps is planned for UMTS). 
Secondly, the sector is characterized by a complex phenomenon of 
convergence: A convergence of techniques allows the usage of the same 
protocol (IP) for almost all applications and networks; and thus the creation 
of new services and the convergence of a large range of activities. The 
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telecommunications, hardware, software and information sectors have 
become closer to each other and favour the convergence of usages: 
consumers always benefit more from offers integrating the various services 
(fixed and mobile telephony, internet, music, television, etc.). This 
convergence also favours the emergence of new types of players, like the 
virtual operator Skype. 
Thirdly, it seems reasonable to forecast that needs for broadband will 
continue to grow in the years to come and that the development of very high-
speed broadband networks should contribute to sector growth, and 
improvements to consumer welfare and the economy as a whole. However, 
building this new network represents an important risk both for investors and 
for regulators, who generally fear the possible re-monopolization of the 
telecommunications sector. 
Beyond this risk of re-monopolization, the major changes previously 
described in a regulated framework are affecting investment behaviour, as 
well as distorting the incentives of the various types of operator and the 
various markets. 
In fact, these major changes can create the risk of investing in the wrong 
technology at the very least. Indeed the acceleration in the innovation rate 
makes the choice of a technique particularly difficult: is the costly fiber local 
loop a good option when far less costly wireless solutions are (such as 
WiMax) are developing fast? Is paying very high prices for UMTS licenses a 
good idea when future demand is uncertain? The instability of demand 
certainly poses a major risk. Lastly, part of the risk is related to the 
convergence phenomenon since new players in the telecommunications 
market sometimes create value by destroying previous existing businesses 
and the related ability of incumbents to invest and take risk. 
This Schumpeterian creative destruction could be more destructive than 
creative if the value creation resulting from free rider behaviour by firms such 
as Skype or Google, for instance, does not pay for the use of the network, 
but contributes to the overall value of network usage. However, while Skype 
is a substitute for existing traditional services, Google looks likes a 
complement. How should existing and emerging markets consequently be 
regulated in the near future? 
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Regulation of existing and emerging markets: typology and proposal 
If we consider the relation between regulation and the telecomm-
unications sector dynamics, it appears that we must distinguish between the 
case of services and infrastructures. Let us follow de STREEL (2004)'s 
typology in order to develop our reasoning (table 1). 
Table 1 - Typology of telecommunications markets 
 Existing service New service / market 
Existing infrastructure A B 
New infrastructure C D 
Source: de STREEL, 2004 
In case A, ex post regulation should apply, except if entry barriers are too 
high. In this case, ex ante regulation may apply but it must take into account 
the previously mentioned mutations in the sector. The redefinitions of the 
boundaries of relevant markets must consider the risks taken by investors in 
a context of rapid technical change, the social need for new radical 
investments (such as FTTH) and the convergence phenomenon. These 
aspects must lie at the heart of a new regulation policy in order to integrate 
the incentives to innovate and invest in a dynamic perspective. This question 
is particularly fundamental since it conditions whether the traditional 
telecommunications operators will be able to maintain, develop and innovate 
on the network layer, essential for the ICT sectors and for the whole 
economy. How can these aspects be taken into account in the regulation 
policy? The definition of markets needs to evolve more quickly in order to 
integrate evolutions in the sector. Among the 18 markets defined by the 
European Commission, three markets concern broadband and nine concern 
fixed telephony. The definition and analysis of relevant markets must take 
into account the convergence phenomenon: fixed telephony markets, for 
instance, must integrate Voice on IP through ISP and through virtual 
operators like Skype. The other techniques of access, such as cable, must 
also be integrated. Finally, the markets should not be too numerous in order 
to limit intervention by the regulator 
In the cases of emerging services (B and D), it can be useful to 
distinguish if they are complements or substitutes to existing services. In the 
case of complements, the externalities creating wealth and the entry barriers 
for those services must be completely removed. Regulation should 
encourage their development whatever the innovator is (the incumbent or 
competitors). The first mover advantage must be retained otherwise it 
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reduces the incentives to innovate. In the case of substitutes (and even if the 
service is not an emerging one), the problem of financing the infrastructures 
appears to be a real problem, especially in a dynamic perspective of 
maintaining, improving and replacing the network with new innovative 
techniques (which will be a necessary condition for the development of many 
new services). In this case, must we allow operators and service providers to 
use price or quality discrimination, offering better conditions for their own 
services? Must we allow them to charge Google or Skype fees? This is the 
question of Net neutrality. Must we add regulatory constraints while 
operators already face these incentive problems? Conversely, should the 
State help operators by inciting them to invest, as in Korea? For the 
moment, European regulation, far from implementing an industrial policy, 
fosters competition on the retail markets thanks to asymmetrical regulation 
on the wholesale markets (mainly on the markets concerning infrastructure 
accesses). However, this question could be crucial for the emergence of 
services that need new infrastructures (case D). The regulator thus faces the 
dilemma between short and long term aims: Asking for cost-oriented and 
non-discriminatory prices stimulates the quick development of services once 
infrastructures built but discourages the operators to invest into new 
infrastructures (which are however necessary for the long term development 
of the sector). 
In the case of the deployment of new infrastructures (cases C and D), we 
have shown that incentives to invest are reduced and the risk of under-
investment is important when regulation obliges dominant operators to 
provide cost-oriented and non-discriminatory access rates. But the absence 
of regulation induces the risk (more important in 1.5 platform countries) of re-
monopolization of strategic activities. Moreover, a conflict exists (case C) 
between the principle of technological neutrality, which imposes the same 
regulation of the same service (independent of the infrastructure) and the 
principle of not regulating emerging markets. 
In order to avoid such dilemmas, it appears that other types of regulation 
policies could be implemented. Two solutions, partly compatible, seem worth 
exploring. One is inspired from intellectual property theory, and the other is 
the third option previously mentioned (i.e. implementing an industrial policy). 
The first solution has been proposed by BAAKE et al (2005). It consists 
of the temporary absence of regulation ("regulation holidays") in order to 
give operators enough time to get returns on their investment. The 
probability of reaching dynamic efficiency could result from the combination 
between of such regulation holidays and possible ex ante regulation after the 
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holiday period, if specific conditions regarding effective competition are not 
fulfilled. According to GANS & KING (2004), such a period should depend, 
case by case, on the nature of the investment and the associated risk. 
According to BAAKE et al. (2005), steps should be defined: every two or four 
years, the competition conditions could be analyzed and the necessity of 
regulating the infrastructure or prolonging the holiday period could be 
envisaged. Such regulation would thus both incite investors to provide their 
network to competitors on a commercial basis and increase their incentives 
to invest by taking into account the risk and the irreversibility of investments. 
The other solution, which may be compatible with the solution explored 
above, is to implement an industrial policy. This solution would consist of 
actively favouring the development of new infrastructures and services. The 
policy would be investment-oriented (eventually with State's help), rather 
than competition-oriented in order to achieve the development of the sector 
in the long-term perspective. This policy could be understood as a contract 
between the regulator and the dominant operator: asymmetrical ex ante 
regulation would be suspended provided that negotiated goals (in terms of 
regional planning, price, quality of services, type of investments etc.) were 
met.  
These goals would take into account the various dimensions of efficiency 
and the various constraints previously identified for the development of 
emerging markets and the necessary development of both incremental and 
radical investment in the research, service and infrastructure fields. Such a 
solution could thus benefit from the competition between the operators of the 
oligopoly (which did not exist before liberalization) and from providing the 
necessary conditions for planning long term investments (this planning 
resulting from the discussion between the regulator and the operators). 
Moreover, it would not exclude more intensive competition in the market 
where this appears natural. 
These two solutions provide interesting perspective for theoretical 
research and empirical studies since they have been partly chosen in a few 
countries: For instance, the United States decided not to unbundle the FTTH 
local loop in 2003, as did Canada and Korea, following the principles of the 
first solution. These decisions involved important investments in building 
new networks. Korea is also a very interesting example because it applies 
an industrial policy with undeniable success: Thanks to the State's direct and 
indirect support of infrastructure deployment, but also of the development of 
new services and applications (KII project, IT 839 Strategy, etc.), and thanks 
to the development of institutions dedicated to technological surveys (KISD) 
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and to R&D (ETRI), Korea has become a leading country in the ICT field. 
While the European framework for telecommunications is being reviewed, 
such solutions should seriously be studied by the European Commission if 
Europe is to remain a competitive player in this strategic sector. 
  Conclusion 
Should telecommunications regulation change in the future? This paper 
argues that the asymmetrical ex ante regulation model used in Europe 
should be replaced. It should be replaced not only since it is theoretically a 
transitory model, but mainly because continuing with the same regulation 
could represent a threat to the long-term development of the sector. Indeed, 
ex ante may delay or cancel investment projects, especially (but not only) in 
the construction of new infrastructures. In fact, ex ante regulation is 
decreasing the option value of investing: it decreases the expected benefits 
from investment and increases the option value of waiting for competitors. 
Moreover, the ex ante regulation of infrastructures is not only driving the 
sector towards under-investment, but is also distorting investment itself. 
Radical investment in R&D and in infrastructure seems to be more sensitive 
to this type of regulation than incremental investment. 
In this context, we identify three possible options for regulation: 1) 
continuing ex ante regulation as in the past in Europe, 2) substituting ex post 
regulation for ex ante regulation, and 3) implementing an industrial policy for 
macro-strategic and institutional reasons. This paper also highlights the 
necessity of taking into account several major mutations in the sector 
including the accelerated rate of technological progress and innovation, the 
phenomenon of convergence, the necessary development of new 
infrastructures and the associated risks for investors. Considering these 
elements and the dilemmas the regulator is facing between regulating (and 
thus fostering competition, but reducing the incentives to invest, especially in 
infrastructure) and not regulating (and thus increasing the incentives to 
invest in infrastructure with the risk of allowing new dominant positions), we 
propose two possible solutions inspired by foreign policies. The first solution 
consists of offering regulation holidays to investors, with regular reviews in 
order to decide whether to prolong holidays or not. The second consists of 
negotiating a contract between the regulator and operators guaranteeing the 
absence of ex ante regulation if the conditions of the contract (in terms of 
regional planning, price, quality of service, type of investments etc.) are met. 
D. FLACHER, H. JENNEQUIN & J.-H. LORENZI 121 
Bibliography 
ALLEMAN J., RAPOPPORT P. (2006): "Optimal Pricing with Sunk cost and 
Uncertainty", in Cooper R., Lloyd A., Madden G. & Schipp M. (Eds), The Economics 
of online markets and ICT networks, Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg. 
AVERCH H. & JOHNSON L. (1962): "Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory 
Constraint", American Economic Review, 52 (December), pp. 1052-1069. 
BAAKE P., HAMECKE U. & WEY C. (2005): "A Regulatory Framework for New and 
Emerging Markets", COMMUNICATIONS & STRATEGIES, no. 40, 4th quarter, 
pp. 123-136 
BORTOLOTTI B., D'SOUZA J., FANTINI J. & MEGGINSON W. (2002): "Privatization 
and the Sources of Performance Improvement in the Global Telecommunications 
Industry", Telecommunications Policy, no. 26, pp. 243-68. 
BOURGEOIS J. & DEMARRET P. (1995): "The Working of EC Policies on 
Competition, Industry and Trade: A legal analysis", in Buigues P., Jacquemin A. & 
Sapit J., European Policies on Competition, Trade and Industry: Conflicts and 
Complementarities, Edward Elgar. 
BOURREAU M. & DOGAN P. (2005): "Unbundling the Local Loop", European 
Economic Review, vol. 49, pp. 173-99. 
BOYLAUD O. & NICOLETTI G. (2000): "Regulation, Market Structure and 
Performance in Telecommunications", Economics Department, Working Paper, 
no. 237, OECD. 
CALDERINI M. & GARRONE P.: 
- (2001): "Liberalisation, Industry Turmoil and the Balance of R&D Activities", 
Information Economics and Policy, 105, March, pp. 333-44. 
- (2002): "The Changing Nature of R&D Activities in Telecommunications", 
COMMUNICATIONS & STRATEGIES, issue 48, 4th quarter, pp. 53-72. 
COHEN E. & LORENZI J.-H. (2000): Politiques industrielles pour l’Europe, Rapport 
du Conseil d'Analyse Economique, no. 26, La documentation française, Paris. 
CORIAT (2000): "Entre politique de la concurrence et politique commerciale : quelle 
politique industrielle pour l'Union Européenne ?", in Cohen E. & Lorenzi J.-H., 
Politiques industrielles pour l’Europe, Rapport du Conseil d'Analyse Economique, 
no. 26, La documentation française, Paris. 
CRANDALL R.W. (2005): Competition and Chaos: U.S. Telecommunications since 
the 1996 Telecom Act, Brookings Institution Press. 
DAVID P. (1975): Technical Choice, Innovation and Economic Growth – Essays on 
American and British Experience in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
122   No. 64, 4th Q. 2006 
DOSI G. (1988): "Sources, Procedures and Microeconomic Effects of Innovation", 
Journal of Economic Literature, vol. XXVI, no. 3, September. 
FLACHER D. & JENNEQUIN H.: 
- (2006a): "Long Term versus Short Term Regulation: A Model of Investment 
behaviors in the Telecommunications Sector", ITS Conference, Amsterdam, 22-24 of 
August. 
- (2006b): Réguler le secteur des telecommunications ? Enjeux et perspectives, 
Economica, Paris (to be published). 
FOROS Ø. (2004): "Strategic Investments with Spillovers, Vertical Integration and 
Foreclosure in the Broadband Access Market", International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 22, pp. 1-24. 
FREEMAN C. (1995), "The national system of innovation in historical perspective", 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, n°19. 
FUJITA M., KRUGMAN P.R. & VENABLES A.J. (1999): The Spatial Economy: Cities, 
Regions, and International Trade, MIT Press, Cambridge. 
GANS J.S. & KING S.P. (2004): "Access Holidays and the Timing of Infrastructure 
Investment", Economic Record, vol. 80, March, pp. 89-100. 
GILBERT R. & NEWBERRY D. (1988): Regulation Games, Department of 
Economics,Working paper, no. 8879, University of California, Berkeley. 
GRIMM V. & ZOETTL G. (2006): "Capacity Choice under Uncertainty: the Impact of 
Market Structure", CORE Discussion paper. 
JORDE T.M., SIDAK J.G. & TEECE D.J. (2000): "Innovation, Investment and 
Unbundling", Yale Journal on Regulation, vol. 17, pp. 1-37. 
KOTAKORPI K. (2006): "Access Price Regulation, Investment and Entry in 
Telecommunications", International Journal of Industrial Organization, forthcoming. 
KRUGMAN P. (1991): "Increasing Returns and Economic Geography", Journal of 
Political Economy, 99 (3), June, pp. 483-499. 
KRUGMAN P. & HELPMAN E. (1985): Market Structure and Foreign Trade and 
Trade Policy and Market Structure, MIT Press, Cambridge. 
LI W. & XU L. (2002): "The Impact of Privatization and Competition in the 
Telecommunications Sector around the World", Darden Business School, Working 
paper, no. 02-13. 
LEIBENSTEIN H. (1966): "Allocative Efficiency vs. 'X-efficiency", American Economic 
Review, 56 (June), pp. 392-415. 
LIPSEY R.G. & LANCASTER K. (1956): "The General Theory of Second Best", 
Review of Economic Studies, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 11-32. 
D. FLACHER, H. JENNEQUIN & J.-H. LORENZI 123 
LORENZI J.-H. & BOURLES J. (1995): Le choc du progrès technique, Economica, 
Paris. 
MEZOUAGHI M. (2005): Libéralisation des services de télécommunications au 
Maghreb : transition institutionnelle et performances, Notes et Documents no. 23, 
Agence Française de Développement. 
OECD (1993): Glossary of Industrial Organization Economics and Competition Law, 
OECD, Paris. 
POUILLOT D. & PUISSOCHET A. (2002): "R&D Spending on ICT, Overall Evolution 
in the Major Industrial Countries, and Close-up on Telecom Operators' New 
Organization", COMMUNICATIONS & STRATEGIES, issue 48, 4th quarter, pp. 33-
48. 
PYNDICK R.S. (2003): "Mandatory Unbundling and Irreversible Investment in 
Telecom Networks", MIT Sloan, Working paper no. 4452-03, December. 
RÖLLER L.H. & WAVERMAN L.: 
- (1996): The Impact of Telecommunications Infrastructure on Economic Growth and 
Development: a First Look at the Data, The University of Calgory Press. 
- (2001): "Telecommunications Infrastructure and Economic Development: a 
simultaneous Approach", American Economic Review, 91 (4), pp. 909-923. 
de STREEL A. (2004): "A new regulatory paradigm for the European electronic 
communications", ITS European Regional Conference, September. 
URI N. (2003): "The Effect of Incentive Regulation in Telecommunications in the 
United States", Quality and Quantity, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 169-91. 
 
 
